Mobile industry is characterized by a sharp fall in megabyte price which highly bene…ts to consumers. This article aims to identify the main parameters that lead to such a fall and shows that the growth of tra¢ c is by far the main cause. It proposes a parametric model that explains the growth of tra¢ c from investment. Using a 20-countries wireless market dataset to calibrate the model, it shows that investment actually drives the exponential growth of tra¢ c. As the growth of revenues are much lower, the price of megabyte decreases sharply. The role of competition is ambiguous. On the one hand it reduces margin and thus prices, on the other hand, as the relationship between investment and competition turns to be inverted-U shaped, it may reduce investment and therefore slow down the fall in unit price.
Introduction
Prices of telecommunication services is a key issue for competition and regulatory authorities. They have a high impact on the whole economy and in ‡uence the rate of growth (Röller, 2001; Datta, 2004; Wavermann & Meschi, 2005) . To compare prices of telecommunication services across countries and over time, it seems more appropriate to consider the price of a unit of consumption than simply comparing the subscription prices. Indeed, the services o¤ered in a subscription can vary widely over time, across countries and even between consumers while a unit of consumption (minute of communication or quantity of data) is much more suited to the comparison. Usage (in minutes or megabytes) better characterizes the amount of useful service for users than subscription, either as intermediate consumption for business, or as …nal consumption for households. The subscription today includes many more services than a few years ago while the price has not changed in the same proportions. Focusing on the price of the subscription does not account for this huge growth in usage. The unit price of uses better re ‡ects market developments.
The unit price of telecommunications services fall sharply over time, which bene…ts consumers as they highly increased their consumption. What are the causes of such a fall? Is this the result of increased competition? or drastic reduction in operating costs? or rather the e¤ect of technological progress embodied in the network through investment? All these reasons may contribute to lower prices, but not all in the same proportions. To what extent each of them contributes? This paper attempts to answer this question from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. The paper proposes a model that explains the growth of tra¢ c as a function of Investment. It shows that the impact of investment in successive generations of network technologies is predominant in the permanent trend of price reduction of telecommunication services, over time. Static e¤ects like competition and cost reduction are by nature limited. Indeed, competition can not sustainably decrease the rate of margin under 0% and costs can not become negative. Dynamic e¤ects, by contrary, are not limited. Cumulative investments always increase tra¢ c and therefore always decrease unit prices. Using a 20 national mobile markets dataset provided by Yankee Group and Strategy Analytics from 2006 to 2012, empirical evidence from mobile markets stresses that the impact of competitive intensity and operating costs are almost negligible compared to the impact of investment in a period of just seven years.
The fact that investment is the main driver of unit-price reduction leads to important policy implications. In particular, the price cost margin issue is particularly relevant. On the one hand, the current margin has a direct and increasing impact on unit price, on the other hand, the expected margin spurs investment and tends to increase tra¢ c which has a decreasing impact on unit price. Empirical evidence shows that, as expected, the dynamic impact on traf…c dominates the static impact on price in the data which have been studied. Empirical evidence also highlights an inverted U relationship between competi-tion and investment that culminates for an intensity of competition which yields a rate of Ebitda margin close to 40% . As a result, strengthened competition which result in lower margin may accelerate or slow down the decrease in unitprice according as Ebitda margin is lower or higher than the threshold of 40%. Therefore, competition and regulation authorities should be wondering how to invest more rather than how to enhance competition. The intensity of competition should be carefully settled in order to maximize investment and reduce unit prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section is an economic literature review. The third section presents the dataset, the fourth section shows that tra¢ c growth is mainly driven by investment. The …fth section explains the evolution of price per Megabyte according to margin, costs and tra¢ c growth and concludes that tra¢ c growth highly dominates margin and costs. The sixth section discuss on the competition ambiguous impact and the seventh section is the conclusion and the policy implications.
Related Literature
Information Technologies in general and telecommunication industry in particular experience an exponential technological progress growth for more than a century according to (Koh & Magee, 2006) . They highlighted a relatively steady annual rate of technical progress in information technologies around 20 to 30 % from the end of the nineteenth century to 2004. The annual rate of technical progress is even higher between 1940 and 2004, around 25 to 40%, highly above that of energy sector which is around 6% (Koh & Magee, 2008) . In particular, Koh and Magee highlights an exponential growth of performances for a given spent amount. For example, in data storage, the number of Megabits stored per US $, or in data transportation, the number of Kbits per second per Km per US $.
This high technical progress spurs investment. Doms highlights that the sharp increase in telecommunication service providers'investments, in the late 1990s, corresponds to an acceleration of the technical progress rate (Doms, 2004) . Technical progress generates opportunities to improve the quality of service for consumers and encourages telecom operators to invest. (Jeanjean F. 2011) .
Thanks to technological progress and investment, wireless industry data traf…c is experiencing exponential growth for several years (Cisco Networking Index). Such growth, highlighted by Price (Price 1963) has been largely observed in information technologies (Moore's low) and even in other sectors (Tague J. &., 1981) , (Schummer 1997) . Chapin & Lehr (2011) also note this growth in tra¢ c. They indicate that this growth may lead to an increase in infrastructure costs and a shortage of spectrum. They are concerned about the harmful impact that this could have on competition. To cope with this problem, they suggest infrastructure and spectrum sharing. In its report "Supercollider" HSBC suggest market consolidation rather than network sharing. HSBC argues that network sharing is a complement but not an alternative to consolidation. Network sharing reduces costs while consolidation, to a certain extent, supports heavier investment in infrastructure (HSBC, 2014) .
Many papers acknowledge the role of investment in the growth of tra¢ c, however, to my knowledge, none explains how investment generates tra¢ c.
Competition has an ambiguous impact on investment incentives. On the one hand, competition encourages investment with the "escape competition e¤ect" mentioned by (Arrow,1962) , and on the other hand, it deters investment reducing the future expected pro…ts. (Shumpeter,1942) pointed out that incentives to invest are higher in a monopoly than in a competitive market. (Gilbert & Newbery, 1982) underlined that a monopoly …rm is more encouraged to invest in innovation than a potential entrant …rm. As a result, there seems to be an inverted U relationship between competition and investment in the telecommunication industry. This relationship highlighted by (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, & gri¢ th, 2005) between competition and innovation has been extended between competition and investment in several empirical studies (Friederiszick, Grajek, & Röller, 2008; Kim, Kim, Gaston, Lestage, & Kim & Flacher, 2011; Houngbonon & Jeanjean 2014 ).
Data set
The dataset gathers annual …nancial information from 20 countries around the world between 2006 and 2012.
Total revenues, Capex and Ebitda per country in millions $US are provided by Yankee group mobile Carrier Monitor. Four reports have been used according to the world area of the country: "EMEA Mobile Carrier Monitor", "North America Mobile Carrier Monitor", "Latin America Mobile Carrier Monitor" and "Asia-Paci…c Mobile Carrier Monitor". In the rest of the paper, Ebitda is treated as pro…t and Capex as Investment.
Tra¢ c per country in Petabytes is provided by Strategy Analytics on an annual basis. Our purpose is to explain the relationship between investment and data tra¢ c. To do so, we need the total tra¢ c carried out on the mobile infrastructure in each country whatever the type of tra¢ c: tablet, PC, Handset and even the voice tra¢ c because voice tra¢ c, regardless of the technology 2G, 3G or LTE, is part of the customer experience and consumes network resources and hence investment. As the voice is counted in minutes, it is necessary to convert them into bytes for addition on to other types of tra¢ c. It is assumed that one minute of voice represents 95 Kbytes. This is the case using an Adaptative Multi-Rate Wideband AMR-WB (G.722.2) that codes the voice at a 12,65 Kbits/s rate. This is not the only rate used, however, it is a medium rate which provides a good quality. The number of voice minutes as well as the number of users per country are provided by the "Worldwide Cellular User Forecasts, 2013-2018".
The number of users seems more relevant than the number of subscribers because the number of subscription per user highly varies across country. The In all the countries, during the studied period, tra¢ c increases exponentially, while the variations of the other variables are much more moderate. As a result, the average revenue per megabyte (price/Mbyte) decreases sharply. Growth of revenues, Ebitda and Capex are mainly driven by the growth of users. Revenues, Ebitda and Capex per user slightly decreased over the period while Tra¢ c per user increased exponentially. In only 6 years, consumers enjoyed a 10-fold increase in tra¢ c for a nearly constant price. This trend is common to all countries. The table below ( In all countries, the growth of Tra¢ c is much higher than the growth of Revenues; even in the emerging countries where the growth in the number of users is fairly high, like India and China and to a lesser extent Brazil and Mexico.
Tra¢ c is driven by investment
One wonders what is driving this growth? Investment by mobile operators or the increasing use of consumers over time, driven by experience and imitation? Obviously, both are necessary. Investment is necessary to install the capacity required to carry the tra¢ c and consumers' demand is necessary to increase the tra¢ c. What is the relative importance of time and investment in tra¢ c growth? This question is even more di¢ cult because the investment is relatively stable over time, making the cumulative investment strongly correlated with the time, however as Romer said: "no economist, so far as I know, has ever been willing to make a serious defence of the proposition that technological change is literally a function of elapsed calendar time" (Romer P. 1994) .
In order to disentangle this problem, let us consider a basic model that represents the investment in the infrastructures of telecommunication. The operators of telecommunication invest in infrastructure equipments in order to be able to carry the tra¢ c with a good quality of service. New generation equipments are generally developed and commercialized by equipment providers, not by the telco themselves. This is the reason why, in this model, it is assumed that the technical progress is regular and exogenous. Thus the technical progress rate per unit of time is a constant, :This is a simpli…cation. As explained Christensen (1992), technological performance curves are S-shaped and therefore the rate of technical progress is not constant. However, the di¤erent generations of technology are intertwined so that the rate of technical progress, by choosing the most e¢ cient technology, is much more stable.
At a point of time, t; the level of technological knowledge in telecommunication infrastructure is A t : At time t + 1; the level of technical knowledge becomes
At the origin of time, the initial level of knowledge is A 0 : Thus, the level of knowledge at time t writes A t = A 0 (1 + ) t : Investment allows to incorporate the technical progress into the infrastructure. At time t, an amount of investment I t allows to add new capacity, A t :I t in the network according to the level of knowledge. However, the oldest equipments in the network become obsolete and are removed. Let us assume that the equipment lifetime is, ; at time t, all the equipments installed at time t are removed. The variation of the network capacity at time t writes t t 1 = A t I t A t I t for t and t t 1 = A t I t otherwise. Indeed, when t ; there are no obsolete equipments. At t = 0, it is assumed that 0 = A 0 I 0 : At time t; the accumulation and the removal of equipments lead to the capacity:
The carried tra¢ c in the infrastructure can be deduced from the capacity with the occupancy rate, : the tra¢ c writes T t = t :In order to allow a good quality of service and to avoid network congestion, the occupancy rate needs to be su¢ ciently low. However, in order to optimize investment, the occupancy rate needs to be su¢ ciently high. As a result, the occupancy rate must remain in a relatively tight range. In the following, we assume that the occupancy rate of the infrastructure remains constant over time.
Variations of investment over time in each country can be approximated by the Compound Annual Growth rate during the period t 0 = 2006 and t f = 2012 ,
1; such that for each country at time t; Investment writes: I t = I t0 (1 + ) t t0 + t . t is the di¤erence between actual investment and the approximation: I t0 (1 + ) t t0 . It is noteworthy that t0 = t f = 0, because I t0 = I t0 + t0 and I t f = I t f + t f . This provides a good approximation of investment. The graph below represents for all countries the di¤erence between actual Investment and approximation.
Figure.1: Approximation of Capex
The average di¤erence between actual investment and approximation is under 11,3 %. The distribution of the relative di¤erence, for t 2 [t 0 ; t f ] ; t It ; according to both the Shapiro-wilk and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, can be considered as a standard normal distribution with a 0.195 standard deviation (see annex 7.2). Therefore, t is considered as a random error term. For simpli…cation, in equation (1), I t is replaced by its approximation: I t0 (1 + ) t f t0 . As E( t =t) = 0; the approximation does not change the value of E(T t =t) and does not impact the estimation of T t : By de…ning 1 + 0 = (1 + ) (1 + ) ; tra¢ c at time t writes (see proof in annexes):
If this expression is a good approximation of the growth of tra¢ c in each country, it allows to estimate the level of technical progress.
For each country, we consider the following equation:
with " t , the error term such that Even with a low number of observations, the model …ts quite well with observations with R 2 > 0:97 in all country and R 2 > 0:99 in most of countries. This model of tra¢ c growth can be used to calculate the evolution of the price of Megabyte.
The price of the Megabyte
Unit price, up; may be expressed as the ratio between Revenue, R, and tra¢ c, T : up = R T . Unit price is thus inversely proportional to the tra¢ c. The relationship between Ebitda, E, operating costs, C, and revenues writes E = R C , the Lerner index L is de…ned by L = E R . As a result, the Revenue is: R = C 1 L , where (1 L) represents a proxy of competition intensity. Equation (2) provides the expression of tra¢ c growth:
T t = T t0 1 + 0 t t0 . Therefore, unit price writes:
The contribution of each variable to the unit price change is driven by the elasticities:
It is possible to express t t0 according to the technical progress rate and the CAGR of Capex, : t t0 = + with = (t t 0 ) ln(1 + ) and = (t t 0 ) ln(1 + ): represents the elasticity of unit price according to the variations of investment. When Investment increases, is positive and is negative which means that Investment has a decreasing impact on unit prices. In the same manner, technical progress has a decreasing impact on unit price. However, in this model, the possible impact of investment on technical progress is not studied since technical progress is exogenous and supposed to be constant in each country during the period under study. Notice that also depends on Investment. It depends on the steady part of Investment I t0
It is noteworthy that the elasticities of operating costs and competition are constant while the elasticity of investment t t0 depends negatively on time with an increasing absolute value. This means that the impact of operating costs and competition on unit price are static while impact of investment is dynamic.
The sign of the elasticity of operating costs is positive. An increase in operating costs, all things being equal increases the unit price. The sign of the elasticity of competition is negative. An increase in competition intensity, all things being equal, reduces the Ebitda margin and then the unit price. The sign of Investment elasticity is negative because investment increase tra¢ c which reduces unit price.
The impacts of operating costs and competition are static. Their elasticities remain equal to unity. The impacts of investment are dynamic, they increase over time. As a consequence, the impact of dynamic e¤ects becomes predominant after a while. Moreover, operating costs and competition can increase or decrease over time while cumulative investment always increases. Speci…cally, the dynamic e¤ects outweigh the static e¤ects after only a few months. On the entire 7-year period between 2006 and 2012, the static e¤ects appear almost negligible compared to the dynamic e¤ects.
Using the dataset, it is possible to determine the actual contribution of each parameter to the fall in unit price during the period 2006-2012. 
= ln
and Dynamic e¤ect per user, Depu;: ln The following table, Table. 3bis, provides the contributions to the change in unit price in Compounded Annual Growth Rate. The "Total" column represents the cumulation of static and dynamic effects. In CAGR the cumulation is calculated following: CAGR T otal = (1 + CAGR Dynamic )(1 + CAGR Static ) 1: Negative signs mean a decreasing contribution to the megabyte price and positive signs mean an increasing contribution. According to the theoretical model, Total might represent the CAGR of unit price. Empirically, the adjustment between Total and Unit price CAGR columns is R 2 = 0:943 which means that the model provided by equation (4) …ts quite well with observations. Contributions of static e¤ects (operating costs and competition) are relatively low compared to contributions of dynamic effects. In the case of South Africa, for example (…rst line), static e¤ects have entailed a increase by 8% per year of Megabyte price, while dynamic e¤ects entailed a decrease by 37%. Static (per user) e¤ects increased unit price by 1% while dynamic (per user e¤ect) decreased it by 33%. The graph below (…gure.2) compares the contributions of static and dynamic e¤ects to the fall in Megabyte price. Figure. 2: Contributions to the fall in Megabyte price (CAGR 2006 (CAGR -2012 The contribution of static e¤ects may be positive or negative. Indeed, during the period 2006-2012, competitive intensity has increased in some countries and decreased in others. Same for operating costs (see Table. 3). While static e¤ects can increase or decrease unit prices, dynamic e¤ects always contribute to decrease them. During the period 2006-2012, dynamic e¤ects have had a much greater impact than the static e¤ects, and this di¤erence increases over time. Indeed, the elasticities of dynamic e¤ects increase over time while elasticities of static e¤ects remain steady ( see equation 5). Moreover, the potential for change of static e¤ects are limited; indeed, it is not possible to increase competition intensity beyond perfect competition (1 L) = 1, operating costs can not sustainably exceed revenues, revenue per user can not exceed consumers' willingness to pay and the number of users ( di¤erent from subscribers) can not exceed the population while cumulated investment regularly increases. This is the reason why, on the long run, static e¤ects become negligible compared to dynamic e¤ects.
6 In wireless industry, …erce competition may slow down the decrease in megabyte price.
Fierce competition reduces Ebitda margin. If reduced margin increases investment, then static and dynamic e¤ects act in the same direction and tend to decrease megabyte price. however, if reduced margin decreases investment, then static and dynamic e¤ects act in opposite direction. In that case, since the dynamic e¤ect outweighs the static e¤ect, the overall e¤ect should slow down the decline in unit price. This section empirically highlights that the relationship between competition and investment turns to be inverted-U shaped, in the wireless industry. It is found that the slope of the rate of growth of Investment (Capex) as a function of the intensity of competition measured as (1-L) is signi…cantly and negatively correlated to the average intensity of competition during the period 2006-2012. The slope is positive for the countries with low intensity of competition and becomes negative for the countries with high intensity of competition. This suggests that Investment tends to increase with the intensity of competition when competition is weak and to decrease when it is …erce. As a result, this suggests an inverted-U relationship between competition and Investment. The intensity of competition at which the slope is ‡at is close to 60%. This corresponds to the intensity of competition that maximizes investment.
The rate of growth of investment at time t is de…ned by t =
It It 0
It 0 : The slope of the rate of growth as a function of the intensity of competition is:
For each country, the slope is calculated for the whole period t 0 = 2006 and t f = 2012:
The …gure below, Figure. 3, represents the relationship between the slope of the rate of growth of Investment as a function of the intensity of competition. Countries whose intensity of competition has tended to move away from 60% (increasing or decreasing) also tended to reduce their investment and therefore to slow down the fall in megabyte price. By contrast, countries whose intensity of competition has tended to get closer to 60% (increasing or decreasing) tended to increase investment and to accelerate the fall in megabyte price. The graph below, Figure. 4, shows the contribution of the change in competition intensity to the megabyte price evolution. Countries where the intensity of competition moves away from 60% tend to slow down the fall in megabyte price. Those where the intensity of competition get closer to 60% tend to accelerate it. This is because a moving away reduces investment while a coming closer increases it.
As a result, strengthening competition in countries where 1 L < 60% helps accelerate the fall in megabyte price by both static and dynamic e¤ects working in the same direction. By contrast, strengthening competition in countries where 1 L > 60% may slow down the fall in unit price because in this case, static and dynamic e¤ects work in opposite direction. Static e¤ect accelerates the fall in price while dynamic e¤ect slows down it. But dynamic e¤ect, in the long run, tends to become predominant. Hence, …nally, enhanced competition, in this case tends to slow down the fall in megabyte price.
Conclusion
In a highly innovative industry, like telecommunication and particularly wireless industry, where the technical progress is tremendous, investment becomes the key issue. Investment drives the growth of tra¢ c in an exponential relationship, while competition avoids such a growth of subscription price. Competition tends to decrease price cost margin, however, even perfect competition can not bring down the price below marginal costs, and marginal costs can not be negative. As a result, static e¤ects as competition and cost reduction are limited. Dynamic e¤ects, mainly driven by cumulative investment, by contrary, continuously increase exponentially the tra¢ c. There is theoretically no limit, and in practice, consumers demand continue to support this growth. Tra¢ c increases much faster than revenues, as a result, price of megabyte decreases sharply allowing consumers to bene…t from a higher bit rate for a pretty steady price. This improvement also bene…ts to service and content providers that may provide more services and more contents.
However, There may be a drawback. Investment requires some margin and the increased margin reduces consumer surplus. However, increased margin also may increase investment and accelerate the fall in prices of megabyte. This occurs when the intensity of competition is above the investment maximizing level. In that case, increased investment rapidly compensates for the increased price caused by increased margin, and, as a result, accelerates the fall in megabyte price. by cons, when the intensity of competition is under the investment maximizing level, increased margin reduces investment and consequently, static and dynamic e¤ects mutually reinforce each other to slow down megabyte price.
Competition and regulatory authorities should carefully monitor the rate of Ebitda margin in order to maximize investment. Indeed, Investment is the key driver of price decrease in mobile industry and it is the reason why it is welfare enhancing. In the wireless industry, the price of megabyte depends more on dynamic e¤ects of investment than on static e¤ects of competition and operating costs. Dynamic e¤ects outweigh static e¤ects after only a few months. Thereby, the positive impact of investment far dominates the harmful impact of margin on welfare.
However, it should be noted that this result is speci…c to very innovative industry. In sectors with a lower technical progress, impact of investment is lower, and the inverted-U relationship between competition and investment may not occur or with a di¤erent shape. It is then possible that investment never outweighs the negative impact of increased margin.
Annexes

Proof of equation (2):
Let us denote j = i , from equation (1), using the approximation of investment I t = I t0 (1 + ) t t0 ; the tra¢ c writes: Distribution of " t Shapiro-Wilk test. Null hypothesis: The distribution is normal. Probability of null hypothesis > 0.1, it can not be rejected. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Null hypothesis: The distribution is normal. Probability of null hypothesis > 0.1, it can not be rejected.
Proof of equation (6):
From equation (4):
Tt 0 (1 L)t ln(up t ) = ln(C t ) ln(1 L) t ln(T t0 ) (t t 0 ) ln(1 + 0 ) For t f = 2012 and t 0 = 2006 ln(up t f ) = ln(C t f ) ln(1 L) t f ln(T t f ) 6 ln(1 + 0 ) Same manner: ln(up t0 ) = ln(C t0 ) ln(1 L) t0 ln(T t0 ) Thus ln(up t f ) ln(up t0 ) = ln(C t f ) ln(1 L) t f 6 ln(1 + 0 ) ln(C t0 ) + ln(1 L) t0
We know that 1 + 0 = (1 + ) (1 + ) ; therefore ln
(1 L)t0 6 ln(1 + ) 6 ln(1 + ) This is equation (6) 8.4 Figure. 4, y-axis:
Dynamic e¤ect has two parts, on the one hand, the impact of regular investment according to the rate of technical progress, , in the other hand, the impact of the growth in investment, . Dynamic e¤ect writes ln 
